Fair and equitable benefit-sharing in a new international instrument on marine biodiversity:
A principled approach towards partnership building?
Elisa Morgera* For more than ten years, 1 negotiators in New York have been debating the need for a new international instrument 2 to ensure benefit-sharing from the use of marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction. The genetic material of marine sponges, krill, corals, seaweeds and bacteria in remote areas of the oceans possesses unique characteristics that may lead to significant innovations in the pharmaceutical, food and renewables sectors, among others. 3 But only a handful of countries, and very few companies within them, 4 have been able to file patents related to marine genetic resources, 5 while the vast majority of developing countries are not part of these bioprospecting efforts and are greatly underrepresented in marine taxonomic research. 6 There is still little evidence, however, of patents or products being specifically or exclusively based on marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction, as opposed to resources of other marine areas. 7 From a policy perspective, divergence remains 8 among States whether the freedoms of the high seas, the common heritage regime of the Area, or a hybrid should apply to marine genetic resources under a new international legally binding instrument on marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) . 9 This article will not engage with this question as such, but rather focus on how to ensure benefit-sharing from the use of these resources. The mandate of the BBNJ negotiations has invariably referred to benefit-sharing, without entering into the merit of whether this is a concept attached to one regime or both under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 10 This is not only an escamotage to avoid a principled question that has marred this international debate from the start. Rather, it arguably reflects the evolution of this legal concept in international law. Benefit-sharing was initially seen as part and parcel of the common heritage regime within the conceptual landscape of the New International Economic Order. 11 Actually, benefit-sharing was perceived as the most controversial element of common heritage, and was allegedly the reason why common heritage was not developed in other areas of international law. 12 Benefit-sharing has, however, become increasingly a self-standing obligation in international biodiversity law 13 that is capable of fitting into different regimes for natural resources (both within and beyond national jurisdiction).
14 On this basis, this paper argues that a reflection on benefit-sharing can be entertained independently of the legal status of marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction, 15 and could serve to make progress in developing a hybrid approach to the matter 16 based on an evolutive and systemic interpretation of the law of the sea.
The article will first reflect on the terms in which benefit-sharing has been discussed in the BBNJ negotiations until now, which have been characterized by an operational concern for the type of benefits that could be accrued and distributed. It will then contrast the negotiations with insights arising from other international benefit-sharing regimes, with a view to suggesting a more principled approach focused on "sharing" benefits "fairly and equitably." This will help highlight the potential value added of benefit-sharing to foster deeper and cosmopolitan international cooperation 17 (that is, a global partnership 18 ) vis-à-vis existing UNCLOS obligations on marine scientific research, capacity building, technology transfer and environmental protection. The article will then apply these considerations to the thorny and novel question of digital information on marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction. 19 
The current operational focus on benefits
The BBNJ discussions on benefit-sharing have mainly focused on the nature and type of benefits to be distributed, along with linked questions on the material scope of a new instrument, and the need for a global mechanism and for control of access to marine genetic resources. With regard to the scope, the main concern surrounded the question of excluding fish used as a commodity, as opposed to that used for research and development purposes and possibly also for non-commercial research (such as research necessary for fisheries conservation and sustainable use). A proposal in this regard was put forward about developing a scientific threshold to distinguish fish used as a commodity from fish used by bioprospectors, by defining a certain quantity, depending on species and habitat variability, above which fish would be presumed to be caught as a commodity. 20 Another question that remains very divisive is whether a new treaty should regulate, or otherwise address, access to marine genetic resources. 21 International regulation or control of access to resources is probably the most controversial implication of the proposal to extend the common heritage regime of the Area to marine genetic resources. Lighter-touch proposals have also emerged. Some have suggested, for instance, requiring researchers' prior notifications of intended access to a centralized database, to ensure information-sharing on bioprospecting efforts and monitoring of subsequent use of genetic resources. 22 Access would thus not be made conditional upon obtaining an international permit or necessarily following a prior environmental impact assessment. 23 This obligation could be accompanied by the issuance of "passports" or an internationally recognized certificate of compliance, 24 to ensure traceability of successive uses and users. Benefit-sharing was then linked to access, based on the idea that different pre-conditions could be set for access for different actors or thresholds, including requirements to provide capacity building and technology transfer for the analysis and use of marine genetic resources. 25 Among the possible conditions, one was identified as an upfront monetary contribution by upstream researchers into a global benefitsharing fund as a mandatory advance payment, or as a voluntary payment to ensure exclusive access to certain marine genetic resources. 26 Another (additional or alternative) option was for upstream researchers to ensure facilitated access to marine genetic resource samples and research findings, on the basis of existing UNCLOS obligations on marine scientific research. 27 The sharing of samples has allegedly the potential to minimize the need for re-sampling, thereby preventing unsustainable harvesting. 28 As the value of genetic resources is not clear at the time of access, payments by operators further down the R&D chain were also considered. It was proposed requesting additional monetary benefit-sharing upon commercialization of products derived from marine genetic resources, and use "earn-out provisions" for triggering earlier payments at certain non-financial and financial milestones.
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The vast majority of the proposals have thus focused on various types and triggers of benefits. Convergence was only found on the need for the new instrument to address non-monetary benefitsharing, however.
30 Divergent views surrounded the question of whether monetary benefit-sharing should also be specifically provided for and whether an international benefit-sharing "mechanism" would be needed to that end. 31 Opposition to monetary benefit-sharing was based on the fact that there already exist functioning centres and databases for documenting and sharing biological and genetic data, which arguably already provide for non-monetary benefit-sharing in the form of information-sharing. 32 A new instrument could thus contribute to make this a more systematic practice. Limited capacity of different countries to access and make use of the information contained in databases, as well as intellectual property protection of databases themselves, however, have not been adequately discussed. 33 The need to ensure inter-operability across databases through standardization of collection, storage and benefit-sharing practices 34 and to deploy a 'coordinating tracking system' 35 has also been underscored. Others raised the concern that the immediate provision of samples and information may act as a disincentive for scientists, 36 presumably on the understanding that it takes time to determine the potential value of genetic resources and other scientists may be able to determine it without taking the risks and bearing the costs of bioprospecting in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Many delegations appear to share the view that non-monetary benefit-sharing may be more immediate and predictable, as well as more significant in development terms, than monetary benefitsharing. In effect, it has been argued, with reference to other international regimes, that non-monetary benefit-sharing helps respond to endogenously identified needs through capacity-building that effectively bridges equity gaps in R&D. 37 But the insistence on an exclusively non-monetary approach raised suspicion that it would merely encompass existing good scientific practices, and not change the current ad hoc approach that has not sufficed to fully implement existing obligations on capacity building, technology transfer and marine scientific cooperation. 38 As a developed country group cautioned, non-monetary benefit-sharing could amount to relying on existing UNCLOS provisions embodying generic obligations to make research findings available through publication and dissemination, and promote data and information flows, 39 which are largely non-implemented. Some developing country delegations cautioned against making funding for capacity building and technology transfer conditional on access and use. 40 Furthermore, what has become increasingly clear in the negotiations is the understanding that monetary/non-monetary is a false dichotomy, because non-monetary benefits have costs and economic value. 41 For instance, sharing raw data on marine genetic resources as an open access resource still requires the development of adequate infrastructure and curation; training has costs related to trainees' travel, precious space/resources on expensive scientific research vessels, trainers' time, and scholarships; and the sharing of best practices requires analysis and effective delivery of information.
A principled approach to benefit-sharing and its value added
What has lacked in the BBNJ negotiations, and admittedly is often missing as an explicit consideration in other intergovernmental processes on benefit-sharing, is a more principled exchange on what it means "to share" benefits and when such sharing is "fair and equitable." As discussed below, benefit-sharing is a treaty objective, an obligation and a mechanism under international biodiversity law. It is also a component of the human right to science, 42 which is relevant to the BBNJ negotiations, as well as to international biodiversity law. 43 While the status of benefit-sharing in international law remains a matter of speculation, it can be argued that it is emerging as a general 34 principle of international law, 44 as a sub-set of the general principle of equity, 45 as it transcends particular treaty regimes as the manifestation of consensus among developed and developing countries 46 on 'the evolution of a new balance of rights and duties in many fields of international law' 'in a world deeply divided by conflicting ideologies as well as conflicting interests'. 47 It has been argued elsewhere, that benefit-sharing, as a sub-set of the general principle of equity, is "open-textured and evolutionary" and "may be filled with content by establishing a linkage with different international legal sub-systems." 48 A principled approach can thus build not only upon the experience of other international benefit-sharing agreements related to genetic resources, but also on the objectives and standards of other areas of international law. The BBNJ negotiations have, of course, already identified the relevance of international biodiversity law for developing a new instrument, although, as will be discussed below, mainly form an operational rather than principled perspective. In addition, it is argued here that international human rights law 49 also provides insights and standards for filling with content benefit-sharing obligations under a new instrument on BBNJ. This is notably the case of the human right to science. It was proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 50 and has been enshrined in several treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 51 so its legally binding force is not under discussion. 52 It is seen as an autonomous right that is worthy of protection for its contribution to the continuous raising of the material and spiritual standards of living of all members of society, both for individual emancipation and collective economic and social progress. 53 As such, it may contribute to the enjoyment of other human rights such as the rights to food and health, 54 and therefore significant for the realization of SDGs 2 (hunger) and 3 (health and well-being). In addition, the right to science contributes to " [protecting] and [enabling] each person to develop his or her capacities for education and learning, to form enduring relationships with others, to take equal part in political, social and cultural life and to work without fear of discrimination." 55 It therefore contributes to the implementation of SDGs 4 (education), 8 (decent work) and 10 (inequality).
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In 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on cultural rights Farida Shaheed suggested that the right to science encompasses four distinct elements: the right to share in the benefits of science for everyone without discrimination; the opportunity for all to contribute to scientific research; the obligation to protect all persons against negative consequences of scientific research or its applications on their food, health, security and environment; and the obligation to ensure that priorities for scientific research focus on key issues for the most vulnerable. 57 While the international law of the sea does not refer to human rights and is framed in terms of inter-State obligations, its provisions on scientific cooperation, technology transfer, capacity building and environmental protection can be read in light of the human right to science, as UNCLOS is a living instrument that is interpreted in light of other relevant international law developments. 58 Applying such an international human rights law lens would serve to highlight how limited implementation of these inter-State obligations negatively affects individuals and groups. In effect, recent efforts to conceptually clarify the human right to science have specifically pointed to inter-State technology transfer obligations, 59 arguably expressing a discontent about the current level of cooperation and implying that non-compliance with international environmental provisions on technology transfer is also a matter of international human rights law. 60 Thus, current efforts to clarify the content of the right to science provide useful insights also for BBNJ negotiations, which are expected to play a prominent role in advancing science.
61 And this in turn will be particularly relevant for the role of a new instrument in supporting the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals across scales. In other words, a human rights lens may provide a powerful analytic tool for deepening the understanding of the content of, and consequences of noncompliance with, international provisions on scientific cooperation, technology transfer capacity building and environmental protection, including vis-à-vis small-scale fishing communities and traditional knowledge holders. 62 The next two subsections will focus on how reliance on the the right to science helps fleshing out a principled approach to "sharing" benefits and to fairness and equity.
Why focusing on "sharing" benefits?
Legal scholars engaging with the right to science argued that "sharing" benefits is a key conceptual element to be clarified in this context. Mancisidor, who is currently leading the development of a general comment on the right to science, emphasized that the concept of "sharing" indicates agency. 63 The traveaux preparatoires of the Universal Declaration suggest that "sharing" conveys the idea that even if not everyone may play an active part in scientific advancements, all persons should indisputably be able to participate in the benefits derived from it. 64 In other words, beneficiaries should not be passive receivers of benefits, but active participants in discussions about the nature of benefits, their desirability/appropriateness, and their distribution modalities. While not explicitly referring to agency, other international sources have pointed to the linkage between benefit-sharing 55 and the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples, 65 or more generally to partnership building among different stakeholders. 66 On that basis, it has been argued that "sharing" implies a concerted, iterative dialogue aimed at finding common understanding in identifying and apportioning benefits to lay the foundation for a partnership among different actors in the context of power asymmetries, 67 and possibly different (world)views. 68 This relies on a consideration of a menu of benefits, the nature of which can be economic and non-economic, with a view to taking into account the beneficiaries' needs, values, and priorities through a contextual selection of the combination of benefits that may best serve to lay the foundation for a partnership. 69 In other words, benefit-sharing is not about the sharing of any benefits irrespective of the views of the beneficiaries. It should therefore not be understood in a mere logic of exchange, but rather as the identification of path towards a deeper form of cosmopolitan cooperation to realize relevant international objectives.
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But what difference would such a principled discussion make in the ongoing BBNJ negotiations? What value added would such understanding of benefit-sharing offer vis-à-vis existing UNCLOS obligations that already provide for non-monetary benefit-sharing, such as scientific cooperation, capacity building and technology transfer? A common trend seems to be emerging in other international benefit-sharing regimes that may provide an answer to these questions. Namely, a concerted and iterative dialogue can be arguably facilitated at the international level through a proactive and institutionalized multilateral approach to facilitate and broker, and possibly also oversee and identify gaps or issues in, an otherwise ad hoc flow of information-sharing, scientific cooperation and capacity-building activities. 71 One such example can be found in the context of guidelines on training programmes for operators used by the Secretariat of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). The guidelines act as a benchmark for assessing operators' exploration proposals. They specify that the training programme should be designed and carried out for the benefit of the trainee, the nominating country and ISA member states, with every attempt being made to follow best practice at all times and to contribute to the training and capacity development needs of the participants' country of origin. The guidelines also emphasize that the provision of training is no less important than any other activity included in the proposed plan of work and should be afforded the 66 On the intra-state dimension of benefit sharing, see, e.g., CBD, Mo'otz Kuxtal voluntary guidelines for the development of mechanisms, legislation or other appropriate initiatives to ensure the "prior informed consent", "free prior informed consent" or "approval and involvement", depending on national circumstances, of indigenous peoples and local communities for accessing their knowledge, innovations and practices, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use and application of such knowledge, innovations and practices and for reporting and preventing unauthorized access to such knowledge, innovations and practices, CBD Decision XIII/18, para. same priority in terms of time, effort and financing. 72 In addition, the guidelines assist in matching suitable candidates to training opportunities offered by contractors. The ISA Legal and Technical Commission agrees on a list of pre-approved candidates from the roster on the basis of transparent criteria and conducts regular reviews to ensure that the goal of equitable and geographic sharing of opportunities is followed.
Another example can be found under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which is developing a more institutionalized multilateral approach to support information-sharing and its links to capacity building. The development of a Global Information System (GLIS) 73 is under way with a view to integrating and augmenting existing information systems, by promoting and facilitating interoperability among them, and creating a mechanism to assess progress and monitor effectiveness. At the same time, the GLIS proactively identifies opportunities for all to contribute to scientific research, providing capacity development and technology transfer. 74 This shows the potential of more institutionalized approaches to ensure responsiveness to the needs of those benefitting from information-sharing, provide oversight of the distribution of benefits across different regions, and contribute to a more systematic encouragement of virtuous circles through capacity building.
Overall, this trend across international benefit-sharing regimes supports the proposal in the BBNJ negotiations for an international benefit-sharing mechanism, shedding light (as will be discussed below) on the possible roles of a clearinghouse. It also provides useful basis for assessing, by comparison, the potential role of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission under a new instrument on the basis of its existing and planned competencies and initiatives.
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A concerted and iterative dialogue through a proactive and institutionalized multilateral approach can also serve to identify and address any shortcomings in benefit-sharing that will emerge through implementation. This may be particularly useful with regard to monetary benefit-sharing, as the key lesson learn in other multilateral benefit-sharing instruments is that monetary benefits are very difficult to be accrued in practice. This is most notably the case of the ITPGRFA, 76 where government donations have been relied upon to operate the Benefit-sharing Fund, as a trigger for monetary benefit-sharing linked to patent-related access restrictions has 'proved to be ineffective.' 77 This is partly because of the uncertainties and length inherent in a bio-based R&D process and partly because of loopholes in the system (as genetic material is available outside of the system, in private-company genebanks or the collections of non-Parties). 78 To address the need to ensure the financial viability, ITPGRFA parties are thus considering an upfront regular payment of fees by users. 79 Another interesting example, already in operation, is provided by the WHO, which is implementing a system of mandatory contributions (annual partnership contributions) to its benefit-sharing instrument related to pandemic influenza. 80 Each year the WHO issues a questionnaire that identifies potential contributors, such as companies and institutions that conduct research and development in the field of influenza and all recipients of pandemic influenza preparedness biological material recorded in the Influenza Virus Traceability Mechanism database. 81 This shows the potential of 'partnership contributions from commercial partners interested in accessing materials and metadata from institutions that belong to a public [marine genetic resources] research network.' 82 Overall, a principled focus in the negotiations on "sharing" benefits can lead to a more systematic discussion about the objectives and functions of a benefit-sharing mechanism as an iterative partnership-building process for enhancing the implementation of UNCLOS and other relevant international law. This could serve to weigh different options to address the challenges that have characterized other international benefit-sharing instruments, such as the need to identify users that could become benefit-sharing trend-setters in their sector, the financial viability of both monetary and non-monetary benefit-sharing and in particular the challenges in linking monetary benefits to intellectual property rights with the result of restricting the use of materials that may provide other benefits to humanity. 83 Furthermore concerted and iterative dialogue through an institutionalized multilateral approach can serve to better understand the interactions between monetary and nonmonetary benefits for building capacity, even where there may be institutional distinctions in the accruing and delivery of monetary and non-monetary benefits. 
Why focusing on fairness and equity?
Another key element of benefit-sharing that is often left undetermined in intergovernmental negotiations is equity. 85 Benefit sharing is invariably accompanied by the qualification 'equitable' 86 or 'fair and equitable' 87 in existing international treaties. The mandate of the BBNJ negotiations, however, was silent on whether benefit-sharing was linked to equity and fairness. 88 This section will first outline the different views of equity that have emerged in the BBNJ negotiations. It will then discuss the implications of addressing equity through a standardized contract and different ways to approach the distribution of benefits, with a view to identifying additional options arising from the application of the human right to science.
Different conceptions of equity
Under the BBNJ process, national delegations have expressed different conceptions of equity underlying the different jurisdictional regimes established by UNCLOS. Developing States have argued that the common heritage approach should be adapted to marine genetic resources, as both deep-seabed mining and deep-sea bioprospecting are activities that are only available to high-tech countries, thereby raising the same equity concerns than minerals in the Area: resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction should not be appropriated exclusively by technologically advanced States, but rather conserved and exploited only for the benefit of humankind, without discrimination. That is, control of these resources should be placed under an international institution to manage and regulate activities which must be conducted for peaceful purposes and lead to sharing revenues, as well as technology, research results and building-capacity opportunities (participation in scientific expeditions and follow-up research).
89 Some suggested that this role could be played by the International Seabed Authority itself. 90 Certain developed countries, however, have opposed this view of equity, underscoring that the high seas freedoms, as the default regime that applies in the absence of an explicit indication to the contrary in UNCLOS, supports a different equity perspective. According to that view, research and development on marine genetic resources in the deep seas is a highly costly and time-consuming endeavour with uncertain results, that when successful would benefit humanity in the form of scientific advancements contributing to global public health, food security and environmental protection. These countries have indicated openness to some form of nonmonetary benefit-sharing, either through codes of conduct or the ad hoc sharing of data and research results, capacity building and scientific collaboration.
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While this divergence of views was not expected to be overcome during the preparatory phases of the BBNJ negotiations, some proposals were put forward about specific equity dimensions of a new instrument. One suggestion was to link "fair and equitable" benefit-sharing to UNCLOS preambular language on a "just and equitable international economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of [hu]mankind as a whole," as this was also the basis for UNCLOS benefit-sharing provisions in relation to outer continental shelf resources and deep-seabed mineral resources.
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Another proposal was to create a review mechanism over time to assess fairness and equity in actual benefit-sharing arrangements under a new instrument. 93 The latter could be part of a global benefitsharing mechanism supporting a concerted and iterative dialogue based on continuous learning.
From a theoretical perspective, it has been argued that the use of the two expressions 'fair and equitable' serves to make explicit both procedural dimensions of justice (fairness) that determine the legitimacy of certain courses of action, as well as substantive dimensions of justice (equity) 94 to balance competing rights and interests 95 to the benefit of all, not just to the advantage of the powerful. 96 References to fairness and equity in international law are thus understood as a mandate for the global community to engage in a dialogue to develop a common understanding 97 of what is understood as fair and equitable, including in light of other relevant areas of international law. options from different justice perspectives in developing a new international instrument. 99 Specific justice considerations can be drawn from the right to science, such as prioritizing 'simple and inexpensive technologies that can improve the life of marginalized populations' and the 'development of international collaborative models of research and development for the benefit of developing countries and their populations.' 100 In both cases, the preferences of intended beneficiaries and local contextual elements need to be assessed, 101 to prevent dependency on exogenous, ready-made solutions that may not fit particular circumstances or the exertion of undue influence. 102 The components of the right to science thus provide concrete pointers: non-discriminatory results, prioritization of the needs of the vulnerable, and protection against negative environmental and socioeconomic consequences of scientific research.
Accruing benefits through standardized contracts
Defining legal choices in a new instrument on benefit-sharing, however, would not exhaust the space for dialogue on concrete fairness and equity dimensions. Although multilateral benefit-sharing is often conceived as an inter-State mechanism, all existing multilateral benefit-sharing mechanisms ultimately rely on standard contractual clauses to reach non-State actors that will ultimately be those producing benefits. 103 A standardized contractual approach in principle allows to distill intergovernmental consensus on certain conditions to achieve fairness and equity in the relationship with a private user, while making a clear and explicit connection with the public international law dimension of the benefit-sharing obligations under an international instrument. 104 To that end, such a contract can make reference to treaty objectives and international provisions as terms of reference for the interpretation of the contract, 105 to ensure uniform interpretation across jurisdictions where users may be based.
In addition, a standardized contract can address the risk of differing interpretations by national courts, 106 by opting for alternative dispute mechanisms. This can be done on the assumption that nonjudicial means entail higher flexibility, simpler procedures and lower costs than national judicial ones. 107 Such an assumption, however, needs to be critically examined. In actual fact, alternative dispute resolution (particularly arbitration) may well be costlier than access to national courts, and can be less transparent as arbitral awards are usually confidential. In addition, arbitrators are likely to be more familiar with (and, therefore, more inclined to give weight to) commercial law than public international law dimensions of the dispute. From a private international law perspective, a principled objection can also be identified: arbitration essentially 'takes away from States altogether' their regulatory authority over the private law questions at hand, 108 and with that also the regulatory authority over the underlying public international law objectives. 109 There is, therefore, a risk in diverting disputes from courts, as public bodies may be better entrusted to pursue public objectives. The risk consists in exposing parties to power imbalances in the resolution of the dispute, and to potentially lower standards of justice than those presumably inherent in national courts. 110 In addition, even in the context of standardized contracts, complex legal questions arising from the interface of public and private international law in relation to access to justice as a human right 111 cannot be excluded and have only started to be mapped in legal scholarship.
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A principled discussion on fairness and equity under a new BBNJ instrument could thus address issues around interpretation in light of public international law objectives of standardized benefitsharing contracts, as understanding of equity and fairness issues evolves among relevant parties. It could seek to find a balanced approach to confidentiality, legal certainty and access to remedies also in light of relevant international human rights standards and the different dimensions of the right to science in particular. A cautious and iterative multilateral dialogue on the use of contracts from a fairness and equity perspective is particularly important as research on the role of benefit-sharing contracts remains very limited. 
Distributing benefits through other multilateral approaches
Establishing more specific conditions for equity and fairness in benefit-sharing to a standardized contract does not exhaust the need for multilateral dialogue either. For one thing, these contracts are mainly concerned about accruing benefits from users, but may not necessarily address the question of the distribution of benefits. Along these lines, as complementary approaches to a standardized contract for benefit-sharing, the World Health Organization has developed a benchmark for equity in relation to the distribution of benefits based on the principles of public health risk and needs. 114 On this basis, a prioritization of beneficiary countries is carried out by the WHO's regional officers. The WHO Director General oversees the distribution of benefits, with the support of an advisory group (comprising a mix of internationally recognized policy makers, public health experts and technical experts) that monitors implementation and provides recommendations on the application of the fairness and equity criteria. 115 A similar model could be conceived under a new BBNJ instrument, on the basis of global assessments of risks for ocean health and needs to address them, and an involvement of regional seas conventions and relevant sectoral bodies in the identification of beneficiary countries.
A different approach for the distribution of benefits has been adopted instead under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: a global Benefit-Sharing Fund channels benefits to particular activities in developing countries with a view to assisting particular communities and partner research institutions in producing global benefits (in terms of conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity) as well as the livelihoods of concerned communities. 116 Equity and fairness are therefore addressed through specific eligibility and selection criteria to assess project proposals, which were adopted by the ITPGR Governing Body and applied by a panel of experts. This approach could serve to create links between international and local benefits, taking into account the local contributions to, and implications for, the realization of the SDGs in relation to traditional knowledge holders whose relevance have become increasingly clear in the BBNJ process.
117 It would also be in line with guidance under the Convention on Biological Diversity on integrating traditional knowledge in marine impact assessments and ecologically and biologically significant marine areas.
118 It could also chime with ongoing global scientific assessments such as those under the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. 119 At the same time, however, the competitive nature of a project-based approach may take insufficient account of the unequal capacities of different countries and actors. 120 To address some of these concerns, the ITPGR Secretariat has organized a series of workshops and a helpdesk function to assist applicants to prepare proposals. 121 Prioritizing and effectively supporting beneficiaries in an increasingly complex landscape of actors and different (public and private) interests remains an issue under the ITPGRFA and should be considered also in the context of the BBNJ process.
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A principled discussion of a benefit-sharing mechanism under a new BBNJ instrument could focus on fairness and equity criteria and approaches for distributing benefits in order to avoid discrimination and respond to the needs of the vulnerable, while preventing negative environmental and socioeconomic consequences of scientific research. Such a discussion could focus on possible means to target both global and local benefits, as well as on opportunities to build on global and regional findings and institutions. The discussion could further reflect on ways to receive and assess proposals from local actors, and supporting new collaborative approaches and learning across scales.
Digital sequence information
The previous sections have made the case for a principled focus in the negotiations of a new BBNJ instrument on "sharing" benefits and on fairness and equity to lead to a more systematic discussion of the objectives and approaches of a benefit-sharing mechanism as an iterative partnership-building process for enhancing implementation of UNCLOS and other relevant international law. This could serve to learn from the lessons accrued in other international benefit-sharing instruments with regard to fairness and equity, including the trend to rely on more institutionalized multilateral approaches to assess progress and challenges, facilitate and broker, and ensure coherent implementation of multiple international obligations. Such a discussion could also focus, taking into account the human right to science, on how to distribute benefits in order to avoid discrimination and to respond to the needs of the vulnerable, in light of various international objectives (human rights standards, as well as multiple Sustainable Development Goals). And considering the connectivity of the ocean, a principled discussion on a benefit-sharing mechanism could consider opportunities to building on global and regional assessments, as well as receiving inputs from traditional knowledge holders and researchers, with a view to supporting collaborative approaches and learning across scales to deliver global and local benefits.
All these considerations will now be related to one of the trickiest questions around benefit-sharing in a new BBNJ instrument -whether to subject to a future benefit-sharing regime also digital sequence information on marine genetic resources, rather than only the genetic resources themselves.
123 This is a question arising from bioinformatics, i.e. the application of computer science and information technology to expand the understanding of biological processes and to generate value in the genetic material without physical access to the biological sources where it was originally found. 124 The underlying North-South divergence of views on digital sequence information has emerged in various fora, including existing benefit-sharing mechanisms under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and ITPGRFA. On the one hand, developing countries argue that the prevailing or growing trend in bio-based research to rely on digital information may ultimately render physical access to the genetic resource unnecessary, thereby making the premise of current benefitsharing regimes obsolete. Even if R&D based on physical access and on digital information will continue to co-exist in practice, exchange of digital sequence information would escape international benefit-sharing requirements, frustrating the objective of relevant treaties. Developed countries, on the other hand, argue that the scope of existing benefit-sharing instruments does not cover information, but only genetic resources in their physical form. 125 A counterargument offered by developing countries is that through sequencing and genetic manipulation in the lab, digital information "re-materializes" as genetic resources in every sense of the term.
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More specifically under the CBD, the terminology concerning digital information remains subject to debate. 127 It is unclear whether the definition of 'utilization' of genetic resources under the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing (ABS) under the CBD, 128 which is one of the sources of inspiration of the BBNJ negotiators, may encompass reliance on digital information. Even if that was the case, however, the overall architecture of the Protocol has been conceived without specific consideration of bioinformatics. CBD Parties thus noted, in 2016, "rapid advances regarding the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources," the "importance of addressing this matter in the CBD framework in a timely manner," and the need to consider in 2018 "any potential implications of the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources for the three CBD objectives."
In the specific context of the ITPGRFA, already in 2013, Secretary Shakeel Bhatti highlighted the 'increasing trend for the information and knowledge content of genetic material to be extracted, processed and exchanged in its own right, detached from the physical exchange of the plant genetic material' and called on Parties to widen the focus of the ITPGRFA provisions with the potential to address the non-material values of genetic resources. In 2017, a proposal was made by the African Group to reflect the concept of digital sequence information in a revised Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) under the ITPGRFA through a new definition of genetic parts and components as "elements of which they are composed or the genetic information/traits that they contain. consensus was reached on if and how to reflect this issue in the text of the revised SMTA. 129 In addition, the African Group suggested inviting, pending clarification of their benefit-sharing obligations, voluntary contributions to its benefit-sharing fund from users of digital sequence information on genetic resources obtained from the ITPGRFA Multilateral System and from the use of which such users obtained benefits. While the proposal did not find sufficient support, the Treaty's Governing Body is expected to consider at its meeting in 2019 the potential implications of the use of digital sequence information for the objectives of the Treaty.
130
The argument put forward in this paper is that while views may diverge on the most persuasive legal interpretation of the scope of existing benefit-sharing agreements, a solution that fosters increased cooperation and multilateral learning should be favored in the name of the principles of effectiveness and good faith. 131 These principles support interpretations that contribute to ensure full effect to a treaty, 132 rather than depriving international provisions of impact on the ground. 133 They further suggest 'rejecting results that maintain an uncertain position or the perpetuation of disagreements' 134 and rather privileging an approach aimed at 'better protection or implementation of universal values, and in addition [ensure] international institutions are involved to monitor or steer the process.'
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These ideas clearly chime with the proposed principled approach to sharing benefits fairly and equitably as an institutionalized multilateral partnership-building process, thereby guiding the developing of a new international instrument, in addition to the interpreting of existing ones.
Considering limited progress in other areas of international law to address digital sequence information, the fact-finding studies commissioned under existing international benefit-sharing processes, 136 and in particular the studies prepared under the CBD and the ITPGRFA, provide useful insights for the BBNJ discussions. Notably, these studies provide a sense of current scientific practices in relation to digital sequence information, and how they challenge the conceptual premises of existing international benefit-sharing regimes. In addition, these studies identify certain ways forward that can be assessed on the basis of the principled approach to fair and equitable benefitsharing discussed above in relation to the BBNJ negotiations. Finally, this section will suggest considering the merits of addressing digital sequence information "from the side", rather than "head on," along the lines of an incipient initiative on information sharing under the ITPGRFA. In terms of current scientific practices, the 2018 CBD fact-finding study underscores that currently most digital sequence information 'is the product of sequencing technologies that have become faster, cheaper and more accurate in recent years… and permeates every branch of the life sciences and modern biology today.'
Opportunities and Challenges
137 So, on a positive note, new genetic sequences that are routinely published in sequence databases can be seen as 'a resource for the global community' that has led to 'dynamic knowledge hubs and diffuse scientific collaborations. ' 138 This is particularly significant in terms of non-monetary benefits supporting advancements in marine science that contribute to conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity, which is seen as an essential contribution of benefitsharing in the BBNJ negotiations. 139 The CBD study, for instance, underscored that technologies related to digital sequence information can serve to 'deepen knowledge about diversity including by identifying and mitigating risks to threaten species, engaging ability to track illegal trade, identifying species and geographic origin of products, and assisting with biodiversity planning and conservation management.' 140 The study also noted the potential for digital sequence information to lead to products that can be used to control invasive alien species, reduce consumption of fossil fuels, or reduce pollution from manufacturing. 141 Views submitted to the CBD from Parties and stakeholders further pointed to opportunities for open access to digital sequence information to support prioritizing conservation efforts in situ and ex situ, evaluating the effectiveness of in situ conservation, collecting information on genetic variation, understanding resilience and adaptability of populations vis-à-vis environmental changes and climate change, and reducing need to take samples from wild populations. 142 Some of the examples mentioned in the submission were specific to the marine environment, such as the restoration of coral reefs through the selection of appropriate places for reintroduction, the definition of population stocks for fisheries management decisions, as well as the labelling of fish to certify its legal origin, to clarify whether it is derived from aquaculture or capture, and to show compliance with quality control. 143 Several challenges, however, were identified in the CBD scoping study. First, there are often-ignored equity issues in relation to sequence databases. Most countries do not have funds or capacity to maintain comparable databases and the benefits from digital sequence information (usually underestimated) accrue to the few countries hosting databases and their users. 144 This finding challenges the argument advanced in the BBNJ negotiations that current scientific practices may already cater to developing countries' needs. Power imbalances have also been underscored in the ITPGRFA study, which found that database operators, and scientists, notwithstanding open-access and open-source sharing ethos, are resistant to implementing tracking and generally agree to "publishing and making accessible other 'parts' or information whose money-making potential is more theoretical," while 'strategically patent[ing] research tools with clear commercial applications.' 145 Furthermore, the study indicated that researchers would not normally share 'developments with commercial potential, particularly where, for example, the research was funded by government entities interested in local or regional job creation, and in seeing clear economic benefits returning to taxpayers.' 146 In addition, relevant technologies have increasingly blurred 'distinctions between different industrial sectors, and between academic, government and industry research, … as academic research institutions require generation of economic value and to that end seek intellectual property rights.' 147 This means that devising benefit-sharing that differentiates between upstream and downstream, non-commercial and commercial, actors along the R&D chain (particularly for monetary benefit-sharing purposes), as discussed in the BBNJ negotiations, may be based on inaccurate assumptions.
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The ITPGR scoping study systematized digital sequence information-related developments as challenges to three pillars of international access and benefit-sharing regimes (identification, monitoring and value generation), as well as the premise that the control over access to resources enables the identification of users and the establishment of contracts. 149 Without recurring explicitly to the same distinction, the CBD study also offers insights on the challenges to these three pillars, which are relevant for the BBNJ process.
With regard to identifying the provenance of digital sequence information, the CBD study indicates that increasingly publication of new genetic sequences in sequence databases is accompanied by information on provenance and meta-data. 150 But identification of provenance can be difficult in practice, as 'sequences from the same species from the same habitat might differ due to natural mutations over short periods of time and sequences from different species and origins may be similar' and/or because 'digital sequences can no longer be recognizable as belonging to a particular source because they undergo several modifications.' 151 The ITPGRFA study, in turn, indicated that the importance of information about provenance varies, as 'researchers may be less likely to return to the original material over time', 'database owners, sequencing companies and others are neither keeping nor requesting information about the material source of digital sequence information,' patents do not necessarily request geographic origin information, and 'the information may be hidden if a particular sequence could be obtained from more than one kind of organism.'
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The ITPGR study also found that digital sequence information undermines the approach to monitoring 'the transmission of the rights associated with the resources through subsequent exchanges,' which in turn relies on the capacity to identify exchanges and track individual germplasm samples. 153 The study acknowledged that database access could be tracked. 154 One option is currently being tested on the basis of block chain technology (the same used for the electronic currency BitCoin), 155 which could be combined with the creation of unique identifiers for the materials for which notification was given.
156 But the ITPGR study found that, on the one hand, 146 Ibid, at 21. 147 Ibid, at 9-11 148 For a similar conclusion, see also E Morgera and G Geelhoed, Consultancy report to the European Commission on the notion of 'utilization' under the Nagoya Protocol and the EU ABS Regulation for Upstream Actors (2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/international/abs/pdf/ABS%20Final%20Report%20upstream%20us ers.pdf. 149 Welch et al (n 145) at ii-iv. 150 Laird and Wynberg (n 137), at 12. 151 Ibid, at 15. 152 Welch et al (n 145), at iv-v. 153 Ibid, at v and 24. 154 even with such tracking, identifying uses of accessed data would not be intuitive due to (1) the myriad ways that partial sequence information can be combined, and (2) the fact that the same sequence or portion of a sequence may be present in multiple organisms. 157 With regard to value generation, the CBD study underscores that it is difficult to assess value and contributions as new collaborations do not include bilateral agreements or direct interaction among researchers. 158 In addition, the authors call attention to the practice of 'bulk studies' that raise different benefit-sharing issues from discrete and unique sequence associated with a particular organism of interest: value is often found in the aggregate as part of larger collection of sequences within databases against which searches and analyses are run. 159 The ITPGRFA study, in turn, concludes that the dematerialization of genetic resources has 'led to a multiplication of innovation trajectories, diffuse uses and means of combining sequences and parts' 160 that 'makes articulation of a specific monetary value of a sequence within an entire new product or process challenging.' 161 The key take-home messages for the BBNJ processes therefore are the following. Digital sequence information is a growing practice, that presents opportunities to create global knowledge and dynamic partnerships and increases the 'potential for generating high-value products, and thus monetary and non-monetary benefits, with the increasing use of synthetic biology technologies in the future.' 162 It also has potential to contribute to conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity. But digital sequence information greatly complicates the identification of relevant actors and the drawing of distinctions among them (which impacts on the setting of triggers for benefit-sharing obligations, as discussed above). In addition, even if information is eventually made available through open-access databases, that does not mean that all individuals in different countries would have the same capacity to retrieve relevant information and put it to use. Nor is there any guarantee that scientists will include in these databases promising or valuable information. Furthermore, the determination of provenance, the tracking of use, and the determination of when value is generated are particularly challenging when digital sequence information is concerned.
Potential ways forward
The ways forward identified in the two scoping studies will now be analyzed with respect to their potential to contribute to partnership building as part of a principled reflection on sharing benefits fairly and equitably in the BBNJ context. The ITPGRFA scoping study considers pooling genetic resources as part of a multilateral benefitsharing mechanism as a way forward: "interviewees generally considered the pooling of benefits to be more feasible and more in line with common research practice." 163 This is also relevant for the BBNJ process, where the idea of pooling marine genetic resource samples and other data through an international clearinghouse has been put forward, 164 as discussed above. Under the ITPGRFA, a Multilateral System already pools genetic resources under standardized contractual terms, which served to rationalize the administrative costs of benefit-sharing. When thinking of the existing System in the context of digital sequence information, the ITPGRFA study indicates that a pooling approach can be suitable to the 'multiplication of holders of digital information collections distributed in a number of media and the diversity of standards, norms and behaviours' as it will allow for 'establishing an aggregated and standardized system at a desirable scale, [requiring] a central authority to adopt and manage collective rights.' 165 But it also points to the drawback that it will 'probably lower flexibility for adaptation to specific contexts.' 166 Furthermore, the ITPGRFA study points to an upfront fee/subscription model for access, although there may be 'different willingness to pay' among users because of 'a shift in perceived value of the collection of [digital sequence information] and recognition of the value of particular entries within databases.' Currently, ITPGRFA Parties are developing an upfront mandatory payment (a subscription system to all genetic resources covered by the Multilateral System), but they have not found agreement yet on payment rates, enforcement measures and whether to include digital sequence information. 167 For its part, the CBD study notes that 'given the blurred boundaries between commercial and non-commercial user, all might gain access on the same terms….some have suggested a global fund to be established to address benefit-sharing from public databases.' 168 These considerations can be related to the proposals for a global benefit-sharing fund in the BBNJ negotiations, and for an upfront payment to ensure the viability of the fund. Financial viability of multilateral benefit-sharing mechanisms, and the complexity in particular of ensuring monetary benefit-sharing from bio-prospecting, are common issues across existing regimes, as discussed above. 169 As such, they underscore the need to learn from experience within and across international processes through systematic monitoring and understanding of bottlenecks. Such systematic learning can be facilitated through a multilateral institutionalized approach, as autonomous efforts by States or other actors are largely seen as less conducive to 'systematically and structurally' improving interinstitutional learning. 170 Learning seems a key aim to keep in mind moving forward as the understanding of scientific practices, and of feasible and necessary forms of accountability and incentives for the scientific community to participate in equitable collaborations, is only incipient. 171 The ITPGRFA study concludes that monitoring the use of digital sequence information requires a mechanism and incentives 'to build norms of exchange across multiple users and uses, ' 172 which further supports the proposition made above about the merits of proactive facilitation, brokering and oversight through multilateral institutionalized approach. The ITPGRFA study also finds potential in the facilitation of public access (both entry-level and advanced users) to synthetic biology technologies and tools for education, participation in scientific endeavors and low-cost investment with a view to supporting social and institutional innovations as mechanisms for identifying and capturing collective benefits (information-sharing, capacity-building and technology transfer). The same finding was also reached in the CBD study, 173 and is directly relatable to the BBNJ negotiations. 174 It chimes with the argument made above about the need for a multilateral institutionalized approach to assess equity issues and look at digital sequence information in the context of relevant technologies, capacities and scientific endeavors with a view to reflecting on potential synergies between obligations on scientific cooperation, information-sharing, capacitybuilding and technology transfer.
The risks related to the increased accessibility of these technologies are not discussed in the ITPGRFA study, but have been identified in the CBD process. Accordingly, undue reliance on digital sequence information could arguably undermine the resolve to conserve biodiversity in situ. It could negatively impact (economically and culturally) other knowledge producers such as traditional knowledge holders. And it may lead to modifying organisms that could become invasive, even within one country. 175 These risks point to the need for oversight at the multilateral level, informed by the dimensions of the right to science outlined above. They also point to the need to address the concerns of traditional knowledge holders, in consideration of their potential role in environmental and strategic impact assessments and area-based management tools under a new BBNJ instrument.
The CBD study also identifies a range of approaches to attach use conditions to digital sequence information: notifications on databases, notices of conditions of use, or click-through agreements. These can be used to assert that the information is patrimony of a certain country (or of humankind, in a BBNJ scenario) and requiring users to acknowledge the source in any publication or contact a focal point if the information is used for commercial purposes.
176 They can also serve to require best efforts to collaborate with a certain laboratory in the analyses and to share products derived from data. 177 The development and use of agreements could be facilitated and brokered by an international body, with a view to systematically ensuring contributions to realizing relevant international objectives, as discussed above.
The CBD study, in addition, reports of new research agreements ('protected commons') that serve to ensure recognition and attribution of material through a flexible and easy process and to involve research collaborations, which do not address monetary benefit-sharing. 178 Rather they contribute to the creation of global web of collaborators contributing in iterative ways to a final product that is openly available for use, including on topics of research that receive less attention by private sector, thereby addressing a situation where each participant is at the same time a provider and a user through reciprocal benefit-sharing. 179 This has the potential to contribute to enhanced implementation of UNCLOS provisions on scientific collaboration in light of the right to science.
The CBD study further notes that researchers increasingly use personal unique identifiers that could allow the tracking of research through their publications all along their careers and could potentially link to sequence data deposited in or accessed from databases. 180 This provides another element of consideration in facilitating inter-operability of existing databases at the international level. The CBD study also recommends separating legal and scientific databases to help address concerns among scientists. 181 This can be a helpful consideration in the current discussions on the need to establish a clearinghouse in the negotiations on a new treaty on marine biodiversity.
Finally, the CBD study points to the opportunity to consider issuing 'fair trade label' to certify that certain companies contributing to benefit-sharing 182 This option could also be considered in the context of BBNJ negotiations, possibly replicating the WHO experience mentioned above of 175 CBD Secretariat (n 142), at 7 and 13-14. 176 Laird and Wynberg (n 137), at 11. 177 Ibid, at 38. 178 Ibid, at 43 179 Ibid, at 47 and 37. 180 Ibid, at 15. 181 Ibid, at 16. 182 Ibid, at 48 identifying key actors that are involved in research on marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction in contributing to a multilateral benefit-sharing fund.
Addressing digital sequence information from the side, rather than head on
While we are still far from the identification of clear solutions to the challenges posed by digital sequence information in existing benefit-sharing regimes, some progress has nonetheless been achieved in the context of the ITPGRFA Global Information System (GLIS) mentioned above.
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This example is to be treated with caution as this initiative is still in very early stages of development and has mainly focused on digital object identifiers to 'unambiguously and permanently identify' genetic resources exchanged across organizations. 184 In addition, the initiative is not free from controversy, as civil society has underscored with regard to the DivSeek initiative.
185 This is a multistakeholder partnership of plant experts working on sequencing and phenotyping data, which allegedly uses technologies to sequence, include in a database and electronically distribute the genomes of crop seeds, without cooperating with the ITPGRFA. 186 Nonetheless, the GLIS represents a salient example for the BBNJ process to address digital sequence information without necessarily first agreeing on a definition or on its inclusion in the scope of a new instrument. It rather addresses digital sequence information in a sideway manner, 187 focusing on existing information-sharing obligations, thereby promoting transparency in this field and having the potential to gradually build some form of multilateral governance of genetic resource-related information.
The vision and programme of work on the GLIS explicitly acknowledge the need to provide principles and tools to support the operation of existing information systems in accordance with the ITPGRFA principles and rules, and promote transparency on the rights and obligations of users for accessing, sharing and using such information. 188 What is noteworthy about the GLIS is that a webbased entry point to information and knowledge is specifically geared towards strengthening the capacity for the conservation, management and utilization plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. 189 In other words, it is a combination of elements to actively pursue the sharing of scientific information by promoting and facilitating interoperability among existing systems, and creating a mechanism to assess progress and monitor effectiveness of such enhanced and more coordinated information-sharing opportunities. 190 The GLIS can therefore provide inspiration for an ambitious and systematic clearinghouse under discussion in the context of the BBNJ negotiations: it is not just an online repository of information, which is rather the case of the CBD or Nagoya Protocol clearinghouses. 191 Rather, the GLIS governance structure can arguably support a concerted and iterative dialogue to identify and respond to needs and priorities of beneficiaries in effectively making use of, and contributing to the production of, digital sequence information, in light with the principled understanding of benefit-sharing discussed earlier on. In addition, as discussed above, the GLIS provides institutional support for setting priorities, brokering of scientific cooperation, capacitybuilding and technology-transfer opportunities. For these reasons, it could also help operationalize identified synergies among the elements of a new BBNJ instrument, such as the scientific, capability and technological needs related to carry out or participate in environmental impact assessments, marine spatial planning and marine protected areas. Although this indirect approach focuses only on non-monetary benefits, it can possibly help explore in the interim technological solutions to move towards monetary benefit-sharing.
Finally, the GLIS may provide inspiration on how to devise a partnership-building approach that builds upon the various dimensions of the right to science. Tackling systematically inter-operability of databases and other online tools, facilitating the sharing of effective capacities and technologies to make use of them, and enhancing opportunities for collaboration can help ensure that all participate in relevant research efforts. It can also support the identification of priorities for the vulnerable, risks to humans or the environment, and any issues leading to discriminatory results in the sharing of information, by assessing progress and monitoring effectiveness through feedback and periodic consultations. It can finally focus efforts on the priorities of the vulnerable by supporting a focus on 'high-priority material.' 
Conclusions
The final report of the BBNJ preparatory process indicates that further discussions are required on whether a new instrument should regulate access to marine genetic resources, what is the nature of these resources, what benefits should be shared, whether to address intellectual property rights, and whether to provide for the monitoring of the utilization of marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction; as well as with regard to modalities for capacity building and technology transfer. 193 Considering the limited reflection in the BBNJ process on the relevance of the new instrument for the Sustainable Development Goals, 194 the Intergovernmental Conference taking forward the negotiations from September 2018 onwards would benefit from a more principled reflection, focusing primarily on sharing as an iterative process of partnership-building across scales, on specific ways in which international law can cater to fairness and equity in light of other relevant areas of international law. In addition, it would benefit from taking into consideration the four dimensions of the human right to science, as earlier discussions on marine genetic resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction were recognized as essentially aimed at 'increasing humankind's knowledge about nature.'
195 A principled approach can provide a much-needed compass to weight the detailed, but still fragmented, proposals related to benefit-sharing, including on novel issues such as digital sequence information, towards enhancing cooperation to implement UNCLOS obligations on scientific research, capacity building, technology transfer and environmental protection holistically in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
